In 2013, William Ruto joined the government as an equal partner and became Kenya’s Deputy President as an established politician, and is departing as both an accomplice and a victim.
In 2020, he was forced out of Jubilee, the party he wholeheartedly helped build to make it look like a national party. But what matters is the reason behind the creation of Jubilee as a stand-alone party. Previously, Jubilee was a coalition of The National Alliance (TNA) and the United Republican Party (URP) and Ruto ran a coalition government with President Uhuru Kenyatta.
The coalition governed between April 2013 and August 2017. In 2016, one year before the presidential election, Ruto was convinced to dissolve his URP party and join TNA and other small parties to form Jubilee party. That day was the beginning of the process to block him from succeeding President Uhuru Kenyatta.
The buccaneer Sugoi kid, who became a member of parliament in 1997, was eager to make a mark on politics, but the harsh reality is that he will be remembered for abandoning the bulk of his deputy-presidential duties to concentrate on election years away, and behaving as a co-president.
Ruto’s political obituary was written on March 9 2018 when President Kenyatta and former premier Raila Odinga signed a deal to work together and initiated a constitutional change process. Two years later, on May 11 2020, it was reaffirmed when Ruto’s closest allies were removed from the Senate leadership after Jubilee and KANU – a party led by Gideon Moi, Ruto’s rival, signed a coalition agreement.
Following Jubilee-KANU deal, Senator Kipchumba Murkomen (Elgeyo Marakwet), was removed and replaced with Senator Samuel Poghishio of KANU (West Pokot), and Susan Kihika (Nakuru) was axed as Senator Irungu Kingata (Murang’a) took her position as the Senate Majority Whip, who was subsequently removed. Jubilee is now Uhuru Kenyatta’s.
Ruto established himself as Rift Valley political kingpin, then a national figure. In 2016, he turned a blind eye to the dissolution of his party. Now he must be regretting that decision.
There has hardly been anyone visible in Jubilee than Ruto, who believed the party will help him ascend to power in 2022, and seemed duty-bound to deliver on promises Jubilee made to voters, crisscrossing the country, seemingly selling the government agenda; boosting the economy, constructing roads, uniting Kenyans, but in reality campaigning for the next election and trying to wrestle support from Mr Odinga in Western and Coastal regions that traditionally backed the former prime minister.
He even appeared on international media on behalf of Jubilee, insisting his party won the 2017 presidential election, and labelling Mr Odinga as a ‘serial loser who will not accept the will of the people.’
The shotgun marriage between President Kenyatta and Ruto was a success in their first term in office. They built the strongest political alliance Kenya has ever seen. The president’s allies avoided criticising Ruto even when they felt he was undermining his boss because they needed his support in the following election, but hell broke loose after the March 9 handshake.
Ruto has been the face of opposition to the initiative championed by President Kenyatta and Orange Democratic Movement leader Raila Odinga. He feared the handshake between Mr Kenyatta and Mr Odinga represented an existential threat to his path to State House. The handshake was a crisis for Mr Ruto – it complicated his political future. The ‘hustler’ as he calls himself, who carved his niche in Jubilee, is now an outsider within his own government.
Ruto felt the unity between President Kenyatta and Mr Odinga threatened the existence of Jubilee and made his relationship with the president complex, shattering his dreams of becoming Kenya’s next president.
From the moment he became a member of parliament, a cabinet minister and, ultimately, a deputy president, Ruto had his sight on State House.
In an interview in 2009, he was asked whether he wants to be president. “Why would I be in politics if I do not want to be a president,” he responded.
By choosing to be a deputy president, Ruto chose the wrong path to State House. Historically, deputy presidents do not succeed their boss. Ruto could become president, but not in 2022.
What comes next after Janan’s surrender?
By Siyad Abdigedi
The surrender of Abdirashid Janan to the Federal Government of Somalia ushered in a period of calm for the citizens of Gedo. Residents of Mandera and Beled Hawo towns, which are located on the border of Kenya and Somalia, respectively, feel a big weight lifted off their shoulders, they no longer have to worry about a potential conflict of armies, which has always been reported to result in civilian casualties.
Just a few months ago, an aggressive dawn assault by Janan’s men on the Somalia federal army in Beled Hawo resulted in the killing of an entire family of six, with only the mother surviving the attack. A number of Janan’s men were also captured.
Janan, a former Jubaland state government security minister, was detained in Mogadishu in August 2019 for suspected human rights violations but fled in January 2020 and had been on the run before his recent surrender.
The surrender was secretly orchestrated by Janan’s loyalists and Somali Chief spy Fahad Yassin. Janan was later fired from his position as a security minister by Jubaland’s leader, Ahmed Madobe, for surrendering to the federal government in Mogadishu. He was flown to Mogadishu and met with top security officials before handing over his militia and weapons days later as talks between him and the federal government continued.
The Federal Government of Somalia and the administration of Jubbaland have been at odds. The Farmajo administration had previously rejected Madobe’s re-election but later accepted its legitimacy to serve as a transitional government for two years.
Possible results of Janan-Mogadishu negotiations
Rub my back, I rub yours, will most definitely be the compromise between the two parties. In return for cutting ties with Madobe’s camp, Mogadishu can grant him amnesty from his case.
The surrender of Janan to Mogadishu represents a significant political breakthrough for Farmajo because it ensures the stability of the Gedo region. Janan was a crucial figure in Jubbaland administration, and his surrender, along with his forces, weakens Madobe’s camp morale. He not only defected with troops and arms, but also with secrets, which is a critical asset in countering Ahmed Madobe.
Farmajos’ administration could also be planning to advance troops in the near future in order to capture Buale town with the help of Janan and his men and make it Jubbaland’s capital city. Middle Jubba is made up of four districts: Buaale, Sakow, Salagle, and Jilib, all of which are now under the rule of Al Shabaab. Planting an alternate regional government here would undermine the Madobe administration, which is headquartered in the port of Kismayu.
The talks between the two could follow a separate path, yielding a myriad of other possible outcomes that would undoubtedly have a significant effect on Jubbaland politics in the coming months.
Siyad is a security analyst with an emphasis on the Horn of Africa.
ICJ to hear Somalia, Kenya maritime case despite Nairobi withdrawal
The International Court of Justice is scheduled to begin hearing the oral arguments in the maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya, despite the latter pulling out of the proceedings in protest after being denied a fourth extension to postpone the case.
In a rare move, Kenya informed the court earlier this week that it would not be participating in the oral arguments, citing its unpreparedness brought on by the global pandemic and the presence of Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, a Somali national, on the international court’s bench.
Somalia’s legal team will present its oral arguments first, between 3 PM and 6 PM on Monday and will continue its presentation on Tuesday between 3 PM and 4:30 PM.
The ICJ will hold the hearings in a hybrid format – another feature Kenya objected to – in light of the COVID pandemic. The hearings will be aired on a Livestream on the court’s website and UN Web TV.
Somalia launched legal proceedings against Kenya at the international court based in The Hague in August 2014 after failing to settle the issue through diplomatic channels. Kenya questioned whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case, pointing to the 2009 MOU signed with Somalia’s then Minister for National Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirahman Abdishakur. The court rejected that claim and ruled in June 2019 that the court was within its legal rights to adjudicate the case. Since then, the issue has been delayed and postponed several times at Kenya’s request.
At stake is a potentially lucrative, triangular stretch of 100,000 square kilometres of offshore territory believed rich in hydrocarbons and fish.
Despite Kenya’s withdrawal, the ICJ can still proceed with the case and render a verdict since Kenya has already submitted its written arguments to the court. The ruling cannot be appealed, but its enforcement relies on the UN Security Council, of which Kenya is a non-permanent member.
Kenya withdraws from ICJ maritime case with Somalia
Kenya has notified the International Court of Justice that it will not participate in the maritime case against Somalia just a day before it is scheduled to begin. Kenya has cited the court’s perceived bias and its unwillingness to delay the case – for a fourth time – due to the pandemic as the main reason for withdrawing from the legal proceedings.
Kenya’s Attorney General, Paul Kihara Kariuki, notified the ICJ of the decision to pull out in a letter written on March 11 to Phillippe Gautier, the court’s registrar.
“Kenya wishes to inform the court, through the Registrar, that it shall not be participating in the hearings in the case herein, should the same proceed from March 15, 2021, as presently scheduled,” the letter from Kenya’s attorney general states.”
Despite Kenya’s withdrawal, the ICJ can still proceed with the case and render a verdict since Kenya has already submitted its written arguments to the court.
Kenya, who referred to the move as “unprecedented in its history in relation to any international adjudication mechanism,” told the court that its latest legal team did not have adequate time to prepare for the case. Various Kenyan media outlets reported that top-level international lawyers were brought in to lead the maritime case in late February 2021, just weeks after the court rejected Kenya’s request to have the maritime delimitation case with Somalia postponed for the fourth time. Kenya added that the global pandemic had stripped it of financial resources to fund the case.
“The consequence of this is that Kenya and its legal team were deprived of the opportunity of having necessary preparatory meetings and engagements, ” Mr. Kariuki states.
In addition to the refusal to postpone the proceedings further, the letter to the ICJ cited further causes to justify its withdrawal from the international court.
Kenya objects to the hybrid format the hearings will be held in due to the current COVID pandemic, although some members of the court will attend the oral proceedings in person. Kenya argued that since its defence is based on demonstrations, the current format is “unsuitable for the hearing of a case as complex and as important as the present one.” The court said that the representatives of the parties involved in the case would participate either in person or by video link.
“Since the case is not urgent for any reason, Kenya least expected that the court would make this into the first cause to heard on its merits via video link, despite one party’s sustained, well-grounded objections, Kenya stated.
In building its case for withdrawal, Kenya wrote to the ICJ that one of its jurists, Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, could potentially curry favour in support of Somalia. Yusuf, a Somali national was President of the Court until February this year .
“Kenya’s concerns and perception of unfairness and injustice in this matter are exacerbated by the inexplicable rejection of Kenya’s preliminary objections to this court’s jurisdiction and the dismissal of the request for the recusal of Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, given his past exposure, on behalf of Somalia, o the issues in this case. This is notwithstanding the fact that Kenya has taken extensive measures that are illustrative of its good faith and seriousness in defending this case, including by filing pleadings within the timelines directed by the court.”
Somalia launched legal proceedings against Kenya at the international court based in The Hague in August 2014 after talks with Kenya failed to settle the dispute. The case has fuelled the diplomatic fallout between the two East African neighbours.
Somalia dispatched its team led by Deputy Prime Minister Mahdi Guled last week. Guled expressed confidence that his country was winning the case.
“Our duty is to unite and defend our land and our real estate, which is a historic responsibility and the most precious legacy we will leave to future generations of Somalis,” said the deputy prime Minister before departing from Mogadishu.
The ICJ is tasked with deciding who has jurisdiction over the 62,000 square-mile triangle in the Indian Ocean, which is believed to be rich in hydrocarbons. Neither party can appeal the decision. The court will then rely on the UN Security Council, of which Kenya is a non-permanent member, to enforce the ruling
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